And So It Begins

Like clockwork, McCain’s campaign is responding to Obama’s Berlin speech in almost exactly the way I expected they would:

While Barack Obama took a premature victory lap today in the heart of Berlin, proclaiming himself a ‘citizen of the world,’ John McCain continued to make his case to the American citizens who will decide this election [bold mine-DL].  Barack Obama offered eloquent praise for this country, but the contrast is clear. John McCain has dedicated his life to serving, improving and protecting America. Barack Obama spent an afternoon talking about it.

Also, they are hitting Obama for his cancellation of the “inappropriate” visit to Landstuhl, which is an inexplicable blunder by Obama.  If he was not speaking to the Berliners as a presidential candidate (not credible, but that’s the official line), how can he then invoke his candidacy as a reason to not go to visit an American military base in Germany?   

P.S.  The line about being a ”fellow citizen of the world” was just the most prominent example of how Obama blundered in this speech.  Obama misjudges the public mood here in the U.S. quite badly if he thinks that “this is the moment” when Americans are interested in tearing down walls and embracing globalisation.  The policy implications of this laundry list of trouble spots are serious:

Will we extend our hand to the people in the forgotten corners of this world who yearn for lives marked by dignity and opportunity; by security and justice? Will we lift the child in Bangladesh from poverty, shelter the refugee in Chad, and banish the scourge of AIDS in our time?

Will we stand for the human rights of the dissident in Burma, the blogger in Iran, or the voter in Zimbabwe? Will we give meaning to the words “never again” in Darfur?  

If voters think that electing Obama President will mean doing a lot of heavy-lifting with foreign aid, sheltering refugees in Africa and protecting Burmese dissidents and the Zimbabwean opposition party, they will not be terribly interested in putting him in that office.  I would have thought that he would have understood the public’s weariness with the Iraq adventure better than this.  Does he not understand that one important source of discontent with the war is its costliness and the diversion of resources to Iraq rather than having them used and invested here at home? 

Update: As James notes, besides being grating the claim to be a citizen of the world is also meaningless.

Not Sure McCain Understands Much At All

A surge is really a counterinsurgency made up of a number of components.  I’m not sure people understand that `surge’ is part of a counterinsurgency. ~John McCain

Blogging will be light today and tomorrow, but this deserves brief comment.  This has already received a lot of derision, but what I found striking about McCain’s intransigence over his misunderstanding of how the Anbar Awakening happened (before the “surge,” as I have noted before) is that it grossly exaggerates any stubborn inflexibility that he has tried to impute to Obama.  “Why won’t he admit when he’s wrong?” has been McCain’s newest slogan, and it can be turned back around on him very easily. 

What most people understand by the “surge” is the increase in troop levels by five brigades.  If it were referring only to a certain sort of counterinsurgency tactics, such as those used to turn Sunnis in Anbar against the Islamic State in Iraq forces, it would not be temporary but would be ongoing, but the propaganda word ”surge” itself implies that it relates to troop levels.  The “surge” as such is now at an end, because these have been returning to their previous, pre-2007 numbers.  This seems to be a case where McCain does not understand a basic aspect of the Iraq war, and does not understand that he doesn’t understand it, but will somehow magically continue to get credit for supporting something that he doesn’t understand.  In his view, based on what he says in this quote, all counterinsurgency efforts make up the “surge,” which is itself part of another, still larger counterinsurgency.  In the broad sense that the war is a counterinsurgency, the second part might be true, but the first part is just nonsense. 

Update: Regarding this questionhere’s a reminder of what McCain has actually said about Iraq over the years.

Shocker: Karl Rove Is A Liar (And Also Foolish)

At least Mr. McCain fesses up to and explains his changes. ~Karl Rove

Rove is remarkably clumsy in his defense of McCain on his changed position on tax cuts.  The official McCain mantra today is that McCain (always heroically) opposed Bush’s tax cuts because they were not offset with spending cuts.  His reliable stooge on talk radio, Michael Medved, repeats this deception on a regular basis.  The trouble is that Rove reminds his audience why, in fact, McCain opposed them:

He’d voted against them at the time, saying in 2001 that he’d “like to see more of this tax cut shared by working Americans.”

You might think that this would be something you would want to emphasise in an election year such as this, and you might think this is a perfectly good reason to offer opposition to tax cuts, but it’s not that simple.  Before McCain could become the nominee he had to portray himself as opposed to tax cutting simply because he was such a zealous budget hawk, rather than acknowledge that he had opposed a major Bush initiative out of 1) petty resentment over his primary defeat; 2) a boundless desire to get good media coverage, which tweaking a Republican President would do; 3) phony “bipartisan” concern about the inequities of the tax plan. 

The funny thing is that this is not lost in the mists of time.  You just need to type in the phrases “Bush tax cuts,” “John McCain” and “class warfare” into any search engine and you are inundated with conservative editorials and articles against McCain’s risible excuse-making on his changed position on taxes.  Here’s a Human Events attack on McCain from January.  What’s amusing about this is that McCain could really benefit from being portrayed as a tax-cutter for the working- and middle-class and a foe of “unfair” tax cuts, but the very “class warfare” attacks on McCain during the primaries that forced him to adopt his phony explanation for opposing the 2001 tax cuts prevent him from acknowledging what his real position was.  That this is revealed in a Rove op-ed designed to show the differences between the “flip-flops” of McCain and Obama is particularly rich, but it is also inevitable given McCain’s long record of changing positions on domestic policy to suit the moment.

If it is a matter of integrity and honestly acknowledging a change in position, rather than the relative merits of this or that policy view, the last thing you would want to highlight is McCain’s changed position on tax policy.

Insularity

When I am not advancing arguments for an “insular” foreign policy, I sometimes brush up on my German, so I wasn’t the least bit concerned that Obama put out his advertisements in Berlin in the native language.  I have a little theory that many of the people who endorse our “insular” foreign policy views tend to be more familiar with the cultures and languages of the rest of the world than those who would like to try to rule over it lead everyone to happiness and democracy–indeed, I suspect this is one reason we take some of the views we do–and it is remarkable how often this seems to be confirmed.  If the problem with Obama’s rally in Berlin is that it’s in Berlin, you can make the case that this is unwise and will cause a backlash here at home, but are we really supposed to expect the Obama campaign to advertise the rally using English?  Isn’t it enough that Obama can’t speak German (or pretty much any other foreign language)?

P.S.  Yglesias will be pleased to know that the flier encourages people to use public transportation.    

P.P.S.  Also, the difference between the German-language fliers and that ridiculous Vero Possumus slogan is that the people who did the German fliers actually know German, which helps a bit.

For Some Reason, The Tale Of Nancy Boyda Lives On

Last summer, I noted the numerous references to Nancy Boyda’s abrupt departure from an Armed Services Committee hearing featuring testimony from Gen. Keane.  War supporters kept flogging this as evidence of antiwar Democrats’ intransigence and inflexibility in the face of new evidence.  Never mind that Boyda’s frustration with administration spin on Iraq was, is, widely shared, and her gesture, while a tad dramatic, was actually appreciated in many quarters.  Now Politico has dredged up the episode in its profile of five at-risk Democratic incumbents (most of whom are freshmen elected to traditionally Republican-leaning districts in ‘06) as one of the reasons why Boyda’s re-election is at risk.  At the heart of this sort of analysis is a very much inside-the-Beltway assumption that someone’s opposition to the “surge” will prove to be a major liability for Democratic candidates.  Just as I am doubtful that obsessing about the “surge” will aid McCain, I very much doubt that opposition to it is going to hurt House members.  

One small problem that I see with Politico’s analysis is that it seems to pay no attention to the opinions of the actual people in Kansas’ 2nd District.  At last glance, Boyda was leading former Rep. Jim Ryun by 17 points in a poll last month (and she was leading her alternative Republican challenger by 30), and her approval numbers were quite good.  As Reid Wilson reported:

68% of respondents in her district said she was doing an excellent or good job, while just 21% had a negative impression of her job performance. 54% said they would definitely or probably vote to re-elect Boyda, while just 35% said they would give someone else a shot.

68% approval is usually a good sign that a House member is going to be returned to office.  If these numbers are any indication of how Kansans are responding to Boyda’s performance, those predicting or hoping that anti-”surge” Democrats in “red” districts are going to lose because of their prominent opposition to the “surge” are going to be proven wrong.

Someone Doesn’t “Get It”

Via Ambinder, now for the most important item of the day:

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No doubt, there will be a hue and cry about “ageism.”  The thing that seems strange to me is that every time someone tries to do a McCain parody of the now-infamous New Yorker cover, they end up denying the intention and context of the satire that they are parodying.  There is essentially nothing in this image that is not an exaggeration, or just a representation, of things that are true about John McCain: he is old, his wife once had a problem with prescription drugs, he is closely aligned with George Bush and he does support policies that violate the Constitution.  As a caricature, it works quite well.  As a parody of an image that is supposed to be mocking absurd claims about the Obamas, it completely fails, because the point of the New Yorker image is supposed to be that everything in it is ludicrous and false and obviously so and, more to the point, it is supposed to be exaggerating the absurd claims to their most extreme form.  (The problem with the original image, as I’ve said before, is that it did not exaggerate the claims, but simply repeated them.) 

The more of these parodies people produce, the more literally audiences may take the New Yorker image.  For all of the people who dismiss the argument that there will be people who won’t “get” the satire of the original, there are an awful lot of supposedly clever sophisticates who seem not to understand how to reproduce what the image tried to do, which suggests that they didn’t really “get” it, either.  To do a proper McCain adaptation of the image, you would need to draw an image that combined all of the false smears that have ever been circulated about him by George Bush’s campaign and others, which would mean creating a cartoon so distasteful that no one in his right mind would ever publish it.   

Update: Via Patrick Appel, it would seem that my Scene colleague Peter Suderman is too optimistic when he says:

While polls indicate that a reasonable percentage of Americans still identify Obama as a Muslim, there’s no serious, mainstream belief that he and his wife are terrorist collaborators, gun-slinging militants who pal around with mass murderers and villains.

Technically, Peter may be right, since there is no serious mainstream belief along these lines, but claims that are not far from these do seem to circulate with some considerable frequency.  As I said last week:

But the flag in the fireplace isn’t much of an exaggeration at all of various false charges that Obama has no respect for the flag or the Pledge of Allegiance or what-have-you.  The hubbub over Obama’s “endorsement” by Hamas as some kind of “proof” that he was friendly to Hamas or bad for Israel and the basic assumption shared by many Republicans that leaving Iraq is “surrender” to Al Qaeda (or something like that) aren’t exaggerated very much by the picture of Bin Laden. 

The state senator mentioned in Appel’s post has a telling quote defending his use of an image associating Obama with bin Laden:

You know, blogs are for satire and whatnot and, um, that’s why it’s up. It’s similar to the New Yorker picture. Maybe that’s why this has gotten so much attention, because of that thing that came out a couple days ago.

More than perpetuating falsehoods, the New Yorker cover will now be invoked as a defense for every image that depicts Obama unironically as a terrorist and enemy with some remark along these lines: “Hey, this is just like that New Yorker picture, so there’s no problem.” 

Obama v. McCain (Ohio)

While FiveThirtyEight still projects that Obama will win Ohio and has an explanation for some of the huge difference between Rasmussen (McCain +10) and PPP (Obama +8) on Ohio, this new Rasmussen poll from Ohio is still pretty startling in the movement that it shows relative to last month.  According to the poll, McCain has gained eight points in the last month and now leads (including leaners) 52-42.  Update: I should note that the June poll did not distinguish between results with and without leaners, so the movement in the result without leaners has not been as great: McCain has moved up two and Obama has dropped down three in the first round. 

Obama’s fav rating is down three to 50%, and he gets just 34% of whites and 77% of Democrats.  While he trails among independents 56-33, Obama also loses among 18-29 year olds 50-39.  Obviously, Republican candidates have not won without winning Ohio, so it is essential for McCain to keep whatever lead he has there.  Also, many months remain and this result may not reflect changed attitudes following Obama’s overseas trip.  On the other hand, the poll was conducted yesterday, so it is possible that the respondents saw or heard some positive coverage of Obama’s trip and still did not come away with a significantly different view of the candidate.  It is still too soon to know one way or the other.

Out Of Exile

The strange thing for me about the discussion surrounding this article is how completely centered on Washington it is, as if being a “think tanker” for the opposition party is really “going into the wilderness.”  Yes, it’s a common phrase to refer to the party out of power as being in the political wilderness, but what this means in practice is being forced to work in slightly different parts of the same city and the same buildings and generally getting less press coverage in the process.  The discussion about the article usually focuses on another Megan McArdle statement expressing some excitement at the prospect of new thinking that defeat will encourage.  Ms. McArdle has made this sort of statement before and been chided about it in pretty much the same terms she is being chided now (my semi-defense of McArdle from before is here).  As I have said before, I will just add that there is very little fundamental disagreement here, and the people who are “excited” to go into the wilderness want to do it mainly to develop better policy ideas and arguments that will then translate into political success and legislation.  Those who would prefer to see the party they are allied with stay in power, if only in the White House, are worried that too much can happen if the GOP does not control the Presidency for just four years.  I’m sure that’s because controlling it for eight years has worked out so well for all involved.

It seems to me that the real exile that conservatives have been enduring is their exile from their homes for the sake of going to Washington for one reason or another.  My advice, as usual, is for conservatives to go home or make homes of the places where they are, stop the obsession with party politics and policy agendas and start creating the culture and the world they want to have.  That is a long, slow work of cultivation, but an absolutely necessary one.  Viewed this way, should McCain somehow squeak out a win, this will help to delay and discourage this necessary work and distract conservatives with another administration they will feel, for some reason, obliged to support and defend, or they may feel obliged to indulge in an equally consuming distraction of criticism and opposition.      

Don’t Do It, Jindal!

If Ambinder is right, the talk of a McCain VP selection this week is a diversion to try to drum up some positive coverage.  However, it cannot be encouraging for admirers of Jindal and proponents of rational decision-making in the McCain campaign (ha!) that McCain is headed to Louisiana to meet with Jindal.  Rod’s reasonable VP speculation based on these reports may unfortunately be all too accurate.  As I have said several times before, selecting Jindal would be a grave mistake for McCain and it would be bad news for Jindal, Louisiana and the Republican Party.  It would be the Republicans’ political equivalent of eating their seed corn.  Bobby Jindal will do a lot of people an enormous service, not least to the people who voted for him, if he turns down any McCain offer he may receive. 

Quin Hillyer is correct in his new article on this subject that Jindal should be towards the bottom of a long list of possible nominees, and his reasoning also makes sense:

But fergoshsakes, the guy really does need some seasoning. He has never stayed in any one job long enough — much less an elective political post — to be required to fight off a backlash by bad-ol’-boys who have had time to re-mobilize against him. And he still comes across, in a way Barack Obama doesn’t, as really young. Finally, the national press will be chomping at the bit to turn a few quirks from his admirable social conservatism into something that comes across as a little too extreme and weird.

There is also the added factor that having an extremely young running mate for the oldest nominee for President is likely to go down poorly with those reasonably concerned about the VP being able to act as a competent successor immediately.  For that reason, having a VP nominee with more executive experience than Jindal has seems to me to be imperative, so I think Pawlenty makes much more sense at this point. 

Maliki

Andy McCarthy offers this reminder:

As I’ve mentioned before, Maliki, of the Shiite Dawa Party which opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq in the first place, has long-standing ties to Iran and Syria — and has expressed support for Hezbollah.  The only thing that surprises me about this story is that anyone is surprised. 

McCarthy is entirely right in what he says here, but that raises a couple questions.  First, there is the obvious question of why the U.S. is attempting to pursue a strategy premised on limiting Iranian influence in Iraq and the region while actively backing a government that has no intention of limiting Iranian influence in Iraq and very clearly is led by a sectarian party.  Then there is the question of whether McCain understands any of this when his rejected NYT op-ed states quite clearly that he does not consider Maliki and his government to be sectarian. 

According to the version on Drudge, McCain wrote:

Nor do they [progress benchmarks] measure Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s new-found willingness to crack down on Shiite extremists in Basra and Sadr City—actions that have done much to dispel suspicions of sectarianism.

Leaving aside that Maliki’s actions regarding Basra and Sadr City were part of intra-Shi’ite feuding in the name of establishing the authority of the central government, this statement by McCain shows that he does not understand the nature of the Iraqi government.  (Maliki’s targeting of other Shi’ite groups obviously would not in itself imply non-sectarianism, but would only prove that he wants his faction of Shi’ites to be dominant within the Shi’ite majority.)  Even more than creating a political problem for McCain back home, Maliki’s recent statements have revealed both the untenability of a continued U.S. presence in Iraq and the complete incoherence of U.S. strategy in that country.

Good Grief

My suggestion to Obama: forget Berlin, go to Mecca. ~Tony Campbell

If non-Muslims were allowed to enter Mecca, that would at least be possible, if not very desirable.  Of course, what this suggestion accomplishes is to link Obama’s “unique heritage” (as Campbell calls it) with a trip to Mecca, which is permitted only to Muslims.  Even if the Saudis were inclined to grant an exception, which they almost certainly wouldn’t be, in the eyes of a great many Americans going there would be like carrying around a placard saying, “Yes, I am a Muslim.”  The fewer people who try to help Obama with this sort of advice, the better off he will be.

Just Mostly Absent

So while McCain’s allegation is technically true, Obama has been far from absent on this issue, and it’s misleading for McCain to imply that he has. ~Dylan Matthews

There are only two problems with the Biden defense of Obama on this point: Obama was absent from two of the three full committee meetings and in the one meeting he did attend he asked one question that Biden subsequently mocked during the presidential campaign as unrelated to Afghanistan.  The relevant point to make against McCain’s use of this is that McCain has been absent from all such relevant hearings, which means that both candidates have been neglecting their responsibilities during the campaign.  That’s much better!

Somewhere On The Horizon

On the main blog, Leon Hadar notes the administration’s new “time horizon” language, and I agree with those who are saying that this is a way of claiming that the administration is not interested in an indefinite presence in Iraq without making any meaningful commitment as to when that presence will be ended.  This is not really a shift, as the NYT would have it, so much as it is yet another rhetorical dodge.  Officially, the administration has always wanted to leave Iraq as quickly as possible, and we all know that this claim is not credible.  The difference between such a horizon and a firm timetable is clear enough: the former can be revised and allowed to recede far off into the future, while a timetable ought to mean that there are certain dates by which such-and-such a number of troops must be withdrawn with a final target date for removing all combat troops.  To the extent that anyone links a timetable to conditions, as Obama has done, he is leaving the door open to the same kind of perpetual revision and delay that the “time horizon” concept already allows.  In this, he is not really doing anything new, but that isn’t really reassuring, as The Nation noted earlier this week:

That said, Obama’s Iraq plan has always left the door open for what could become an “occupation of undetermined length” under a Democratic President.  Even as he rejects permanent US military bases in Iraq, Obama has said that no timetable should be “overly rigid.” He has indicated that he would “work with our military commanders” to determine a withdrawal plan. He has supported the presence of residual troops, which could number as many as 80,000, to guard a militarized embassy, combat terrorism and provide training and assistance to the Iraqi government.   

These positions, which he echoed in his Iraq speech on July 15, are not new, but they do raise the concern that Obama’s pledge to end the war on a timetable could become subordinated to a shifting landscape of worst-case scenarios that impose new and unachievable conditions for withdrawal.

Who Cares What The Iraqis Think?

Not John McCain!  Ambinder reports:

“His [Maliki’s] domestic politics require him to be for us getting out,” said a senior McCain campaign official, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “The military says ‘conditions based’ and Maliki said ‘conditions based’ yesterday in the joint statement with Bush. Regardless, voters care about [the] military, not about Iraqi leaders.”

This comes in response to the Spiegel report noted here.  This would seem to be a great coup for Obama, not least since it helps put to rest the charge that his claim in his NYT op-ed that Maliki took this view was based on a misunderstanding, but two things will minimise the political advantage Obama will derive from the episode: Obama’s position on withdrawal is, and for the most part has been, also “conditions-based,” and McCain’s campaign probably has a point that a majority of voters will be more interested in what military officers say about this than in what Maliki says.  However, they are probably most interested of all in what they think our government should do, and public support for withdrawal remains broad. 

Because the administration has closely tied itself to Maliki, it will be more difficult for McCain to dismiss Maliki’s opinion as entirely irrelevant.    What this McCain campaign spin should do is put an end to any question about Iraqi public opinion on withdrawal–as if the Iraqis have ever favoured a long-term American presence!  If Maliki is under significant political pressure to take such a stance publicly, that implies that a continued U.S. presence is very unpopular. 

Contrary to the concerns of my colleague John Schwenkler, this sort of anecdotal reporting does not reflect the overwhelming majority view in Iraq.  The January 2006 World Public Opinion survey of Iraqi opinion cited here is now over two years old, which is worth noting since almost three out of four Iraqis supported a timetable for withdrawal of no more than two years then.  Even with the intervening nightmarish violence of 2006, it is hard to imagine that public opinion has shifted so much that most Iraqis now want us to stay when two years ago 70% of them wanted us to be gone by now.  What is more, 87% supported the Iraqi government endorsing a timeline for withdrawal, and large majorities expected that security would improve in the wake of a withdrawal.  Indeed, as the September 2006 survey showed, despite the horrors of the summer of that year (or perhaps because of them), support for withdrawal remained basically unchanged.  Someone might object that this is old information, so what do newer surveys show? 

One March 2008 survey shows that U.S. forces have the confidence of just 20% of Iraqis, while 72% oppose the presence of U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq.  Opposition to the U.S. presence is higher than it was in 2005, but lower than it was last year, but even in 2005 opposition was at 51%.  With respect to the “surge,” 53% of Iraqis still said as of March that the “surge” had made things worse in the areas where the “surge” took place and only 36% believed that it made things better.  As a political matter, it seems significant that a majority of Iraqis deemed the new tactical plan a failure despite the moderate improvements that it has actually achieved.  43% said that the “surge” made the conditions for political dialogue worse.  That’s a significant change from the 70% who said that the summer before, but most of those who no longer thought the “surge” had made conditions worse simply said that it had no effect.  Of course, these figures point to the fundamental, extremely strong opposition to the U.S. presence of about 40% of the population and to the 38% who want U.S. forces to leave now.  Just 29% of Iraqis think that a departure of U.S. forces would worsen the security situation.  So, yes, you can find Iraqis who will take that view, but they are not representative of most of their countrymen.             

Here at home, as a late June CNN survey found, 64% of Americans want the next President to remove most U.S. troops from Iraq “within a few months of taking office.”  Obviously, no major candidate is proposing a withdrawal that is this rapid, so what is remarkable is how much support this receives.   

Update: Ambinder earlier posed the problem for McCain this way:

To argue against Maliki would be to predicate that Iraqi sovereignty at this point means nothing.

But this view is implicit in McCain’s support for permanent U.S. bases in Iraq.  I suppose ignoring or dismissing Maliki’s comments, as the campaign has now done, helps to make this clear to more people, but at the heart of support for a large, ongoing U.S. presence on Iraqi soil is the assumption that Iraqi sovereignty basically does mean nothing.  This would be roughly consistent with a foreign policy that has regarded Iraqi sovereignty as meaningless for the last 17 years.

Second Update: The McCain campaign seems to think that talking about the “surge” is the answer to all problems.  This is what I am wondering: outside of the bubble of elite commentary, does a candidate’s position on the “surge” matter very much?  McCain has to believe that it does, and he has been riding this one-trick pony of a campaign theme for at least the last eight months.  If I were working for Obama, I would advise driving home how dishonestly McCain represented Romney’s position on the ”surge” as a call for surrender.  This was a complete distortion, everyone knew that it was a complete distortion, many people called McCain on it, but his aura of invulnerability on questions of war made all of that irrelevant and he won the Florida primary–and propelled himself on to winning the nomination–anyway.  The Obama campaign could use this to make the argument that McCain believes that everyone who expresses reasonable doubt and skepticism about a Bush administration plan wants to surrender to Al Qaeda, which could go a long way towards revealing McCain as an unserious and fairly fanatical person. 

The response could go something like this: “The Bush administration prosecuted the war in Iraq incompetently for years, so when the Bush administration proposed sending additional troops to an unnecessary war that has harmed our interests Barack Obama correctly challenged and questioned the wisdom of endorsing yet another plan put forward by a failed President.  John McCain accepted this plan without hesitation, because he has had a record of reflexively calling for the escalation of armed conflicts for the last ten years.  Now the administration is starting to embrace key diplomatic aspects of the Baker-Hamilton Report’s recommendations that Barack Obama endorsed, but which this administration and John McCain rejected at the time.  John McCain offers four years of the same kind of leadership that failed us in Iraq, and our country cannot afford to take that path.”      

Someone might also note that 51% of the public still believes that things are going badly in Iraq as recently as last week.  For it to make any sense, running on the “surge” has to take for granted that a majority accepts that things are going reasonably well.  If a majority still holds that things are going badly even after the “surge,” which has now ended, how does this really help the pro-”surge” candidate?  Wouldn’t the perception that things are going badly despite the “surge” inspire a view that it is futile to remain in Iraq any longer? 

In the official McCain campaign response, it says, “We would not be in the position to discuss a responsible withdrawal today if Senator Obama’s views had prevailed.”  That’s true–had Obama’s stated views prevailed last year, our forces would have already been withdrawn from Iraq for four months by now.  If someone were thinking over at McCain HQ, they would realise that they are obsessed with reminding voters that McCain has supported perpetuating the war in Iraq for the last year and a half when it theoretically could already have been over. 

Third Update: Via The Caucus comes word that Maliki’s team is rapidly backtracking and claiming that Maliki did not say what everyone thinks that he said.  If so, that would make it the second time in the last two weeks that Maliki has more or less endorsed the idea of a timetable for withdrawal and then explained that he has been completely misunderstood or misquoted.  The first quoted statement was one put out by his office and taken from remarks he gave in the UAE, but this second one was made directly by Maliki to a German magazine that should be able to confirm what Maliki actually said.  This will give some comfort to the McCain campaign, since it definitely weakens whatever impact the earlier statements would have had.      

“Ponerangelism”

Rod and Mark Shea have good posts on P.Z. Myers, whose spiritual insanity I had not been inclined to discuss earlier, since it seems that notoriety and attention are what atheist “propagandists of the act” seem to crave most of all.  However, there was something in both posts that I noticed that I thought deserved a few words of comment.  This concerns the use of the word evangelical in describing militant, aggressive atheists of Myers’ sort.   

Shea:

C.S. Lewis describes the curious evangelical itch [bold mine-DL] that rankles in the shriveled soul of the God-hater in his Great Divorce.

I know what Rod, Shea (and Lewis) mean, and I don’t want to be pedantic, but it struck me that crediting atheists with an “evangelical” impulse misrepresents what compels them and it also unintentionally bestows on their message a value that Christians do not believe it possesses.  This is not news to either of them or most anyone else, but since something evangelical properly pertains to good news and specifically to the Good News of the Gospel, it is not really fitting to attribute an evangelical impulse to proselytes of godlessness.  We often refer to proselytism of various kinds, both ideological and religious, as evangelism, and today we may refer to episodes from marketing and politics as “spreading the Gospel of such-and-such,” but I think we would find it strange to use the word evangelical to describe Wahhabi proselytes. 

With a nod to Dostoevsky, I don’t think it would be wrong to say that there is something especially demonic in this particularly aggressive sort of atheism.  If what Myers has done (or claimed to have done) is evil, as Shea rightly notes, his desire to spread word of his evil-doing would have to be called ponerangelism.

Koi Pathar Se Na Mare Mere Dewaane Ko

Here is an adaptation of the same song seen here in the older film Laila-Majnu.

Ha Ya Na?

Yet he [Reihan] also seems to sense that they don’t really coincide, which leaves him in a position where he will neither endorse nor reject the nationalist assumptions of GNP. But either you’re morally in favor of a more cosmopolitan political order or you’re against it. ~Will Wilkinson

This is an unusually strange objection to make against Reihan, who has made very clear that he is a certain kind of nationalist and who agrees with Wilkinson that nationalism and patriotism are extremely closely related (I dissented from this here). 

P.S.  By the way, I’m morally against a “more cosmopolitan political order” as it is meant here.

For Goodness’ Sake!

Clark points out a rather odd post from Robert Stacy McCain concerning, of all things, Ross’ new comments policy, which must be the most talked-about comments policy post in the history of the world.  Having scrolled through Ross’ comments section more than a few times, which is routinely filled with obtuse, obnoxious attacks on him personally without regard to the merit of his argument, I am amazed that it took him this long to implement a more draconian comments regime.  Apparently, the proximate cause of this new policy is that he has acknowledged that Steve Sailer, TAC’s film critic and a regular contributor, was the source of “a passage about the UK’s crime and illegitimacy rates, which appears on page 161 of GNP, draws on data points that I first encountered in an April 2005 column he wrote about the British working class.”  This is nothing more than an intellectually and academically honest recognition of someone else’s work that had been left out of his book’s citations by mistake, but it caused a furore because Ross acknowledged that Steve Sailer may, in fact, be worth reading.  In some quarters, this is the equivalent of cannibalism, or perhaps worse, since they might grant that cannibalism offers some nutrition.  Those of us who have known for many years that Steve Sailer is insightful and smart find the entire thing absurd beyond description, but it has now led to R.S. McCain offering the following guidelines to Ross:

  • 1. Stay to the right of the Left. Don’t try to get into a one-upmanship situation where you’re trying to outdo them in multicultural enthusiasm. You can’t win that fight.
  • 2. Avoid arguments with Paleos. Those guys play for keeps and (as Joan Jett said) they don’t give a damn about their bad reputations.
  • 3. Keep your friends close, and your Neocons closer. This is the flip-side of my advice about the Paleos. Whatever your quarrels with the Neos, avoid making any outright enemies, or next thing you know, you’re an “Unpatriotic Conservative” and NRO will dump you like yesterday’s garbage.

This last point seems the most remarkable, since it plainly acknowledges the culture of intimidation and ostracism that neoconservatives promote as if it were simply a fact of life, rather than a despicable tactic to be repudiated by reasonable people.  The essence of this point seems to be: live in deathly fear of your “friends,” who will try to destroy you the moment that you utter a sentence that they do not like.  Some friends!  The second point is bizarre, since Ross and I have had many arguments over the years and yet somehow Ross has survived and even flourished.  Evidently, I do not “play for keeps.”  The first point is redundant, since there was never any danger of Ross drifting to the left of the Left.

McCain then goes on to complain about the “Buddhist economics” of Crunchy Cons, which doesn’t even begin to make sense as a label.  Aside from the small problem that there is no such thing as “Buddhist economics” (since Buddhists would not be bothered to concern themselves with economics), this line makes complete sense:

When it comes to economics, Mises and Hayek are right and Buddhists are wrong.

Er…okay.  Never mind that Crunchy Cons has essentially nothing to do with Buddhism or Buddhist anything.  If we ever do encounter a Buddhist economist, we will be sure to tell him that he is wrong.  Let us just hope that there are not Buddhist Hayekians, or else this entire nonsensical paradigm might fall apart. 

P.S.  As part of the general Southern conspiracy against R.S. McCain, I guess I must be aligned with Clark, since I did my undergraduate work at an ODAC school.  My college has been called the “Princeton of the South,” so I suppose that proves that we Ivy (and Kudzu) Leaguers stick together.

P.P.S.  Proving that he is not crazy, McCain ends his post with these words in an update:

Harvard, New York Times, PBS, AFL-CIO, al Qaeda — part of my short list of institutions that qualify everyone associated with them for automatic hatred.

Okay, so Ross is supposed to be the one who has the problem?

Update: McCain responds, after a fashion.  This was the part that I found most amusing:

Dreher, Stooksbury, Douthat — what do they have in common? A contempt for the basic consevative idea that the best economic policy is to let the market take care of itself.

Actually, I’m pretty sure Clark has contempt for the idea that this is a “basic conservative idea,” but he can speak for himself.  As anyone who had even glanced at the responses to GNP from me or other “anti-market conservatives” would know, I do not regard Ross “an automatic hero” because of the proposals in the book.  The invocation of protectionism at the end of the post is the perfect conclusion to an argument that shows absolutely no engagement with anything Ross has ever said.   

Simultaneously Weak And Strong

Larry Hunter takes Obamacon enthusiasm to its logical extreme and simply pretends* that Obama’s domestic policy isn’t the domestic agenda he will pursue:

Plus, when it comes to domestic issues, I don’t take Obama at his word. That may sound cynical. But the fact that he says just about all the wrong things on domestic issues doesn’t bother me as much as it once would have. After all, the Republicans said all the right things - fiscal responsibility, spending restraint - and it didn’t mean a thing. It is a sad commentary on American politics today, but it’s taken as a given that politicians, all of them, must pander, obfuscate and prevaricate.

This is roughly as persuasive as Philip Klein’s attempts to discount everything Obama says about foreign policy and national security and assume that he is, in fact, a secret McGovernite/appeaser who wishes Israel harm.  What I find remarkable is that Hunter will take Obama at his word on the war and then conveniently overlook everything else in Obama’s record and his foreign and security policies that suggests that Obama’s credibility as an antiwar politician is quite poor.  In general, Obama proposes an activist, hawkish foreign policy and accepts the use of essentially all the surveillance powers that Mr. Bush received or usurped, and his position on Israel policy is indistinguishable from that of the current administration.  None of this satisfies Klein, just as apparently none of it worries Hunter. 

The worrisome thing about Obama is that it seems you generally can take him at his word when he stakes out a policy position, and most of what he has said he will do is quite awful, especially when judged from an antiwar, constitutionalist conservative perspective.  On the whole, when he has reversed himself substantively it has been in the opposite direction away from those few things that antiwar conservatives have found appealing.  In the last six weeks, he has adopted a more confrontational attitude towards Iran than he had displayed before (and he does this at a time when the Bush administration has started becoming more interested in negotiation!), caved on Fourth Amendment protections and has at the very least “shifted emphasis” on Iraq.  With the opening of intermediate-level negotiations with the Iranians, one of Obama’s signature issues has been co-opted by the sitting administration after he had started to adopt a more belligerent tone regarding the Kyl-Lieberman amendment.  Certainly, this formal opening to Iran is interesting and probably good news, but it also deprives Obama of one of the few aspects of foreign policy in which he remains reasonably distinct from Mr. Bush.   

Of course, you can still argue that Obama is marginally preferable to the even more hawkish, pro-security state candidate in McCain and you can insist that third-party voting is useless, but as the two candidates “converge” it is Obama who is gradually losing whatever attractive features he may have once had in the eyes of antiwar conservatives.  There are tactical “moves to the center,” and then there are capitulations to establishment positions.  The only reason to expect that Obama will abandon his central domestic agenda proposals once in office is if the political pressure to push them through Congress is substantially weaker than the pressure resisting them.  That seems obvious, and perhaps it is, but it goes to the heart of why Obamacon arguments such as Hunter’s make no sense: the preference for avoiding confrontation and political risk that makes Obama potentially less of a concern on domestic policy is the same preference that will ensure that everything Hunter likes about Obama is also going to vanish or diminish after the election.  Put another way, Hunter is basically hoping that Obama proves to be such a weak President that he cannot advance his domestic policy agenda, but that he is also such a tremendously dynamic and effective President that he will be able to restore compromised civil liberties, end the war in Iraq and resist entanglement in a new war with Iran.  That is a pretty rare combination.

P.S.  Actually, Hunter hopes that Obama will be like JFK, but if we took this comparison on its face this would mean that Hunter hopes Obama will be inclined to cut taxes but will botch every major foreign policy decision he ever makes, which would be the exact opposite of Hunter’s stated reasons for supporting him.

* I should clarify: Mr. Hunter doesn’t really pretend this, but simply doesn’t care one way or the other, as he says towards the end:

But here’s the thing: Even if my hopes on domestic policy are dashed and Obama reveals himself as an unreconstructed, dyed-in-the-wool, big-government liberal, I’m still voting for him.

Reveals himself?  He hasn’t been hiding his agenda.  What does Mr. Hunter think Obama has been proposing to do for the last year and a half if not drastically expand the government’s size and role?  What happens when his hopes on civil liberties and foreign policy are also dashed?  This seems relevant, since it is already happening

Satire Vlogging

Ross and Chris Hayes discuss the New Yorker cover, the Obama campaign and more here.

Polling Averages

This is a good example of why creating averages of polls can be a problem.  First of all, the averages for the presidential race, whether at Pollster or RCP, incorporate polls (such as the methodologically suspect June Newsweek survey and the LAT/Bloomberg poll) that are entirely unlike all others that skew the average in a certain direction.  Second, the “average” acquires a strange, almost canonical authority because it includes a number of polling results rather than being subject to the flaws of any particular poll, and people then invoke the average as if it were more authoritative rather than being correctly understood as less precise.  For the purposes of measuring overall momentum, averages can be useful, but when you include everything from typically reliable Rasmussen and Gallup numbers to the volatile Zogby results to the ridiculous PPP you are going to have an average that splits the difference between meaningful and useless.  This is not really to defend Dick Morris, but when he says that Obama’s lead had virtually disappeared in the Rasmussen tracking poll, he was stating something that is demonstrably true.  In the days since he wrote that, a small Obama lead has reappeared, but Obama’s position remains virtually identical to what it was six weeks ago at the end of the Democratic primaries, and for three consecutive days last week the candidates were separated by no more than one point.  Dick Morris is wrong about enough things that we don’t need to impute more errors to him than he already makes on his own.

Update: Sullivan draws attention to Mr. Koffler’s comment below.  I should have made clear in the post that I don’t attach significance to the movement of one tracking poll by a couple points that lasts for two or three days.  I certainly didn’t agree with Morris’ larger contention that this movement was a consequence of various Obama reversals.  Mr. Koffler explains where I’ve gone wrong here, and I appreciate the useful correction to my mistake.  Finally, I stated things in this post quite clumsily, particularly in the line about difference-splitting.       

Tired

I can hardly stand “what our team needs to do” sorts of books. Pretty much all democratic partisan politics is irredeemably nationalist, and I really get tired of largely morally bogus debates about whether caring for poor people means we need to bribe people to get married or to move more money from really rich Americans to relatively rich but not-so-rich-for-Americans Americans, or both. ~Will Wilkinson on Grand New Party

Wilkinson would prefer instead morally bogus debates about whether caring for the poor means abolishing borders and swamping our country with millions of immigrants.  For my part, I get really tired of Wilkinson’s lectures about things and people he identifies as ”nationalist,” when he has made it quite clear over the years that he makes no distinction between nationalism and patriotism, lauds others who fail to make this distinction and in any case doesn’t understand what patriotism is.

On Bishirjian (II)

Ross replies to my earlier post on the Bishirjian essay and Ross’ response to it, and I take his point when he writes:

Actually, the fact that Bishirjian’s essay made many theoretical points with which I agreed was precisely why I thought his completely unimaginative, Limbavian proposals for what conservatives ought to actually do were worth highlighting.

This is fair, and I think I should add that there are several things that paleo and traditional conservatives will find frustrating about the essay.  In Bishirjian’s defense, the essay was not exactly a policy paper and was more of a diagnosis of the current predicament and a statement of what being conservative in such a predicament means, which is why his flirtations with policy proposals are bound to be unsatisfying to anyone, especially those who have just immersed themselves in domestic policy details for many years.  All the more reason why it would have been better to omit them or refocus the proposals on just one thing to show how policy might be profitably changed to advance the strengthening of intermediate institutions (and not just settling for repeals as the essence of policymaking).  Bishirjian’s contrast between national historic sites and theme parks (in which the theme parks were considered preferable because they were privately operated) was undoubtedly one of the most unfortunate parts of his argument, and it seemed to me that this contrast partook, as I hinted before, of an enthusiasm for technological progress and market forces that is not entirely in agreement with his concern to cultivate strong community institutions. 

Having made the case for some of the merits of Bishirjian’s essay before (and I expect I will have more to say about them in later posts), I should say that I found the grab-bag of specific policy proposals mentioned in the essay to be the weaker part of the essay.  Ross is right that instituting a flat tax wouldn not fundamentally change the structure or power of the federal government:

An administrative state funded entirely by a flat tax would, I suspect, look exactly like the one we have today, except the tax burden would be more regressive.

One of the ways the grab-bag of specific policy proposals weakens the essay is that it takes up space that might be used to elaborate on what Bishirjian’s idea of “ordered living” would look like in practice.  For instance, when he urges us to “educate ourselves in the wonderful literature of the West and in the recovery of philosophy that émigré conservative scholars from Western Europe brought to this nation when they were exiled from West, East, and Central Europe,” that implies an enormous amount of vocational work in building and funding schools and staffing them with teachers who are dedicated to instructing people in something between a classical liberal arts curriculum and a Great Books program.  On the college level, it might look very much like St. John’s in Santa Fe, but in earlier stages it is not necessarily as clear how it would be applied.     

To that end, to the extent that he was going to mention education reform, discussing how and why present-day secondary and post-secondary education does not provide this and how it might be changed would have been more relevant to the desired ends that Bishirjian seeks.  Bishirjian seems to suggest that this educational effort must precede the ”preservation and growing” of private institutions, but what seems to be lacking is any idea that there should be the establishment of new institutions, namely schools.  However, new schools would seem to be necessary, since there are very few that would seem to offer anything like the curriculum Bishirjian supports.  More to the point, many, many new private schools will need to be built and staffed if there is to be anything like an interruption of the public near-monopoly on primary and secondary education and if there is to be any likelihood of an improvement in the relative quality of the education received there.  This then raises a host of other very practical questions, starting with a basic one: who is paying for this?  That is, who is covering the financial costs that funding all these new private schools will impose?  At the root of it, though, is a more basic problem: where will one find the teachers?  As I have said more than a few times, one of the reasons why conservatives are underrepresented in educational institutions is that they, we, tend to go into other lines of work and are uninterested in or unattracted to the steady, consistent cultural work of education.  Put another way, conservatives have largely been losing the culture wars because they are not even actively contesting much of the ground. 

The other, more obvious question is: who actually wants such a change in the way education is structured?  School choice is routinely repudiated by middle class, suburban voters, because they see it as a threat to their reasonably good, well-funded school districts.  As Ross and Reihan note in their book and again in the recent article, “The real educational crisis for most suburban families is a crisis of affordability, in which home prices and tax rates in above-average school districts climb as ambitious parents struggle to give their children a leg up.”  If this is an “educational arms race” with ever-rising costs, the logic of Bishirjian’s proposal would probably mean still more significant escalation.